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Copyright as Censorship – Part II
Prof. Jim Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law
January 12, 2010
2010 marks the 300th anniversary of the Statute of Anne, the English legislation that ushered in
the modern era of copyright law. The Statute of Anne is celebrated for a number of reasons, and
perhaps foremost among them is its rejection of copyright as an instrument of censorship. In a
previous essay in this series, I discussed one way in which copyright law historically acted as an
instrument of censorship: its refusal to grant protection to works that courts judged immoral. In
this essay, I discuss copyright’s role in facilitating a different kind of censorship: lawsuits in
which a copyright owner seeks to suppress expression rather than facilitate it.
Suppose a news magazine wants to publish an article about former president Gerald Ford. The
article will reveal fascinating, previously unknown details about Ford’s ascension to the
presidency and his controversial decision to pardon Richard Nixon. The article’s account is
undeniably true, but Ford nevertheless objects. A lawsuit is filed and a federal court rules the
magazine’s publication illegal.
This sounds crazy. Wouldn’t such a ruling be a clear violation of the magazine’s First
Amendment rights of free speech and free press? Ordinarily, yes. But what I have described is
in fact a well-known and not particularly controversial copyright case, in which the publisher of
Ford’s memoirs successfully sued The Nation magazine for publishing an unauthorized sneak
peek of his upcoming autobiography. A ruling that would be inconceivable when viewed
through a First Amendment lens becomes run-of-the-mill when copyright law is invoked.
How do courts in copyright cases avoid First Amendment restrictions? How is it that they
routinely issue “prior restraints” on speech – i.e., by enjoining publication of articles, movies,
music, and other forms of expression? The answer is that such rulings ultimately promote
speech, rather than suppress it (or so the argument goes). Copyright protection allows authors to
market their expression, and profit from it. Any imposition on a copyist’s speech is outweighed
by the incentivizing benefit to the copyright owner, who also has something to say.
Indeed, the Ford case is the source of the Supreme Court’s famous statement that the Framers of
the Constitution “intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.” And the ruling
was not terribly offensive to First Amendment values, given that the newsworthy information
was to be released within a matter of weeks anyway – this time with Ford’s approval. It was
more a matter of speech delayed than speech denied.
Yet flaws in copyright law’s design create room for true censorship. Unlike Ford, some authors
bring copyright claims not because they want to release their expression to the public on their
own terms, but because they want to keep their expression from the public altogether. Although
in theory copyright is supposed to encourage authors to market their expression – to share it with
the public – in practice it bestows its protection without requiring any commitment to publish. A
diary sitting in a locked drawer has as much copyright protection as a best-selling novel. This
was not always the case; in the old days, authors had to publish their works in order to receive
federal copyright rights. But today copyright attaches instantly and automatically to even simple
forms of expression.

When this easily acquired protection combines with the ready availability of injunctions (and
supracompensatory damage awards) in copyright cases, the result is a copyright regime that can
keep information from reaching the public at all. Examples abound. Concerned about his image,
rap star Eminem enjoined a magazine from publishing the lyrics to racist songs that he wrote in
his youth. The Church of Scientology invoked copyright protection to shield its scripture from
public examination and criticism. The famously reclusive author J.D. Salinger prevented the
publication of a biography containing excerpts and paraphrases of his writings. Dunkin’ Donuts
used the threat of copyright infringement to shut down an online forum for complaints about the
company. In each of these examples, copyright was used as an instrument of censorship – with
the government playing the role of willing accomplice through its exercise of judicial power.
Perhaps the parties in these cases deserve some sympathy. Perhaps they should have the right to
hide their dirty laundry from the public. But if there is an injury to be articulated here, it is
different from the economic loss that results from the usurpation of one’s right to profit from
one’s own expression. In other words, it is not the kind of injury that copyright should
remedy. It is instead more akin to a violation of privacy. Looking to copyright law’s propertyrights regime for a remedy thus makes little sense, as Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis pointed
out more than 100 years ago in their seminal article, The Right to Privacy:
[W]here the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits arising
from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent
any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common
acceptation of that term.
Copyright is ill-suited to deal with such concerns. Its constitutional goal is to promote the
dissemination of information, not retard it – “to increase and not to impede the harvest of
knowledge” (to quote the Ford case yet again). It accordingly operates under the assumption that
the author wishes to disseminate his or her work to the public for a fee, and that the only thing
standing in the way is the threat of unauthorized and uncompensated copying.
In theory, copyright law has some mechanisms to mediate this tension between privacy and the
public interest. One example is the fair use doctrine, but it is unpredictable and thus unreliable;
certainly it did not preclude censorship in any of the examples above. Another is the
idea/expression dichotomy, which allows the public to use an author’s ideas without
authorization – e.g., through paraphrasing, rather than verbatim copying. But even paraphrasing
does not always save the defendant, and it is often no substitute for the actual words. (An
accusation that Eminem penned racist lyrics will be unconvincing if the accuser cannot quote
them.)
Copyright once had a different way of dealing with these privacy issues: It left them to state
law. Under what was known as common-law copyright, states vindicated the confidentiality and
privacy of unpublished expression, leaving federal law to deal with published works. But when
Congress decided to do away with publication as a federal copyright prerequisite, it both put an
end to this state system and gave a marketable property right to private forms of expression never
intended for any market.
In the end, then, two solutions to this form of censorship present themselves. The first is for
courts to be more attentive to the role that fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy should play
in lawsuits whose goal is to suppress expression rather than encourage it. The other is to go back

to the good old days: Attach federal copyright protection only to published expression, leaving
state privacy law free to revive its concerns for unpublished works. Either approach would be
better than the current state of affairs.
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